Three years on from Russia’s invasion, there appears to be no sign of their forces letting up. Meanwhile, Putin’s misuse of the media supports his ultimate goal of Ukrainian annihilation
The 24th February 2022 saw the beginning of Russia’s offensive in Ukraine, a ‘special military operation’ as described by Vladimir Putin, that is still raging today. Weeks before, Putin had begun spreading falsehoods about Ukraine to muster Russian animosity.
In an issue of The Russian Analytical Digest from May 2024, Dr Jade McGlynn, a researcher of War Studies at Kings College London, wrote about Russian propaganda tactics through media arms. She wrote of a two-tiered propaganda system being used, differentiating news between Russians and occupied Ukrainians.
McGlynn said that in occupied territories, Ukrainians were essentially force-fed Russian narratives, due to the mandatory installation of Russian satellite channels and the removal of Ukrainian ones. The packages were encrypted so those whom the messages were not intended for could not see what was broadcasted.
Also, occupied Ukrainians were given Russian passports and were threatened with the removal of their children and food provisions if they did not accept them. Then, they were told that they might as well disregard their Ukrainian nationality, as any Ukrainian soldiers who saw the passports would treat the civilians as traitors.
Criticism and even speculation over Russian affairs have proven to be a risky task but many scholars, globally, are conducting research, attempting to understand Putin’s plans and their effects on the people he is aiming to make his own.
Dr Joanna Szostek is a senior lecturer in political communication at the University of Glasgow and is an associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Her research investigates the reception of strategic narratives and the challenge of autocracies exerting influence on democratic states.
Russian’s attempting to block out the noise
Szostek has been analysing Russian state media since Putin came to power. She said: “The state took over a few television channels that were relatively independent in his first year but then over the last 25 years that he’s been in power, the space for independent media in Russia has grown so small now to the point where it’s almost non-existent.”
Academics like Szostek ignore Russian public opinion polls, believing that citizens are unable to express any feelings which do not actively condone Russian foreign policy. Some Russians have also been brainwashed by Putin’s lies in the media about the history of Ukraine.
There is a prevailing sense that many Russians are trying to block out politics from their day-to-day lives. This is not necessarily out of indifference or malice toward the plight of the Ukrainians but rather a feeling that they are powerless and voiceless and so would rather go about their life and try to maintain something like normality.
Szostek added to this with a sentiment of condemnation from Russia’s elite, saying: “I think there are people who are more pragmatic, who would like the war to end and would like to go back to doing business and being free to travel without sanctions.”
Szostek’s most in-depth research came during field work in Ukraine which she conducted between 2015 and 2021, where she investigated how conversing political narratives varied and were received. She reviewed how both Ukrainian and Russian news reports interacted with the public, how it was disseminated and what it meant for public opinion.
She said that one of her main conclusions was that people were more likely to trust news that aligned with their priorities rather than news that reported honest facts. Russian news outlets clocked this attitude quickly and manipulated their outputs to rile further Ukrainian discontent, according to Szostek.
“Some Ukrainians at the time were very negative about the state of affairs of their country so anything that reinforced that negativity would be repeated. That’s what the Russian state was trying to do with their propaganda in Ukraine, saying how there are Nazis everywhere and the economy’s collapsing.”
Dr Joanna Szostek
Her final words broke down the feeling within Ukrainians now, that perhaps despair was not the lead emotion in the country and their national pride still stands strong.
Szostek said: “The Russian media have next to no credibility in most of Ukraine that is not occupied but what happens in the occupied territories becomes a more difficult question because those parts of Ukraine have been sucked into the Russian media environment.
“There’s determination in the Ukrainians that I speak to and recognition that giving up isn’t an option because Russia is out to destroy the whole idea of being Ukrainian.”
The future of Russia with Putin at the helm may appear bleak, but the 72-year-old ex-KGB man has an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, specifically for the forced deportation and unlawful transfer of children from occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia.
Also, Russian crypto coin mogul, Alex Konanykhin, posted to LinkedIn that he would pay one million dollars to anyone who handed Putin or his Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, over to the International Crime Court.
Putin’s use of propaganda to equally buoy Russian support and deflate Ukrainian patriotism has been felt in every media element from billboards to radio bulletins. Propaganda has been a device of media manipulation enacted by Russian autocrats since the days of the Soviet Union.
Russians today are more literate, in both the traditional and digital sense, with over 70% of Russians being digitally literate in 2023, according to the NAFI Research Centre. However, Putin’s lock on state media and continued denigration of Ukrainian sovereignty is an overt link to the USSR.
Media propaganda
Opposing news companies, like Meduza, which is now based in Latvia, and The Moscow Times, which is now in Amsterdam, are operational but they have had to flee Russia.
Professor Paul Goode is an Associate Professor and McMillan Chair of Russian Studies at the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canada. His research explores nationalism and authoritarianism in Russia.
The link between nationalism and propaganda is a key connection for Goode and he believes it to be one of the foremost strategies in normalising the devourment of Ukraine for non-combatants on either side of the conflict.
“Ukrainians have been deceived, that they are essentially Russian, that Ukraine is not a viable state and what Russia is doing is rewriting a historical injustice that came after the collapse of the Soviet Union.”
Prof Paul Goode on Russia’s perspective of Ukraine
The Russian state and compliant companies, like Gazprom, have been known to allow what Goode described as ‘ideological entrepreneurs’ the chance to promote the war effort themselves. Some will even use this opportunity as a ladder up into Russian media.
Goode believes that a new leader would still be a ‘creature of Putin’s regime’ as much of the opposition in Russia, on all fronts, has been smashed. But media-based sabotage could come into play for candidates to ruin each other’s reputations.
Goode said: “Especially now with the spread of deep fakes and AI, the media is a particularly efficient way of carrying out sabotage and so it’s possible that you could see some diversity emerge and the breakdown of central control.”
The authoritarian nature of Russia’s leadership has forced TV channels of all genres to play by the rules of the executive. Ones that have failed to comply or opposed government stances have been shut down or were sometimes even run out of the country, as was the case with Dazhd Television.
As a way of not supporting the regime while staying on the air, many channels report the bare minimum about the war, opting for less controversial topics like lifestyle.
Goode said that this was especially the case amongst regional broadcasters, who opt for subjects like economics. Some may run stories about how local heroes are overcoming sanctions but nothing else, politically, is reported.
Russia’s ability to silence stretches even as far as academics and students. Dara Melnyk is a higher education transformation consultant who worked at the Moscow School of Management when the war broke out. She wrote in the University World News publication of rectors mysteriously losing their jobs and being deported due to their contempt for Russia’s offensive in Ukraine.
“If previously walking on thin ice was a part of the job of a top manager at Russian universities, now it is the job. Speak the truth and you are done…The sound of silence is dreadful. If the communication lines with Russian universities are cut, it will become harrowing.”
Dara Melnyk via the University World News
But fear and the need to lie low is a stark reality for many who are even indirectly attached to Russia. This interviewee, who will be referred to as Dr Greene, has asked to remain anonymous due to their personal ties with the country. They have worked extensively in Russia for many years, studying its interactions with politics and religion. They are now a deputy head of the international relations course at a top British university.
Their view of media was the expected, uncomfortable tale of state control and institutionalised self-censorship, but what the government has offered as an alternative does nothing to ease concerns.
A return to Soviet censorship?
Greene said: “They’ll discuss matters such as if there’s a shortage of eggs or butter but with no implicit criticism of anyone high up but rather for low-level bureaucracy. It’s funny, it’s a little bit of a game but you know what your limits are.”
They also said that censorship over social media and traditional media acts very differently because, like in the West, anyone can have a say and appear just as advised as experts.
This relative freedom has allowed pro-war ‘commentators’ a platform which they use to call for Putin to be even more aggressive, but they may also report the deaths of soldiers, which the state reports inaccurately if at all. They are arrested but, according to Greene, these arrests never normally lead to punishment as many bloggers will have protectors within the government.
The Russian authority’s grip over social media can also be seen through their handling of sites such as Facebook and YouTube, says Greene. Facebook is monitored constantly and while it is not illegal to access it, viewing content that criticises Russia is illegal and can even be viewed as an act of terrorism. YouTube has had its transmission rates lowered by so much that it is virtually impossible to get through a video.
Greene spoke of someone they knew who grew up in Soviet times who now goes between Russia and the UK. They say that no one speaks in places where conversations can be tracked. This attitude was commonplace at the height of the Soviet Union.
They said: “She went to her hairdresser in Moscow and, like hairdressers everywhere, they talk to you a lot, but she said suddenly they were much cagier, and she noticed people saying ‘let’s go and talk in the park’ rather than in apartments or in the café.”
When the USSR fell and Boris Yeltsin became president, the media could freely comment and even mock him. This allowed some to feel that the age of censorship was over in the new Russia, but Putin’s ascension has reversed this attitude entirely.
“Russian TV used to have a show which was similar to Spitting Image which used to lampoon politicians. Yeltsin didn’t like it but he said ‘that’s freedom for you’. Putin closed it down within a year.”
Dr Greene
Not all media companies that have been forced out of Russia are always critical, with papers like The Moscow Times and Meduza running stories about the failures of the Russian opposition and when the war is going badly for Ukraine.
For Greene, Russian news organisations must be devoted to Putin otherwise they become outlawed. A range of deterrents are imposed to stop opposing opinions on the airways, and these deterrents can be much harsher than having your broadcasting licence revoked, like we would in the UK.
Deterrents include cyber-attacks and physical violence toward journalists, who are then tried in absentia while they reside in a country that will not deport them back to Russia, should they be found guilty.
